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not almost all sciences be classified as half-art? The object of historical 
research is clear. It is the past. But if this object is clear, it is, on the 
other hand, very extensive. It should be added that there are other 
sciences whose object is also the past. Historical research has its own 
methods, but other sciences can use the methods developed in the sphere 
of historical research. Conversely, historical research uses methods 
developed by scholars in other fields. Ultimately, it may be that the 
borders of historical research are no more unclear than for most sciences. 
And although it is very natural for historical research to attempt to be 
an independent, separate branch of scholarship, it is probably in- 
appropriate to draw lines which would be, in Hvidt's words, "sharp 
and clear.'' Such lines are mechanical and contrived. 
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Dauxhter: Daddy, do you mean that Sir Isaac Newton thought that all hypotheses 
were just made up like stories? 
Father: Yes - precisely that. 
Daughter: But didn't he discover gravity? With the apple? 
Father: No, dear. He invented it. 
Father. All right. Then I evidently do not know what the word "sort of '  means. 
But I do know that the whole of fantasy, poetry, ballet, and art in general owes 
its meaning and importance to the relationship which I refer to when I say that 
the swan figure [of Swan Lake] is a "sort of '  swan - or a "pretend" swan. 
Daughter: Then we shall never know why the dancer is a swan or a [Petroushka] 
puppet or whatever, and shall never be able to say what art or poetry is until 
someone says what is really meant by "sort of." 
G~ego7y Bateson, Steps to an E c o l o ~  ofMindl 
Reading our facts-vs.-fiction debate, including my own notes for this 
contribution, I am somehow reminded of a Doonesbury cartoon from 
the early 1970s, in which one American says to the other as they are 
trudging through a Vietnarnese landscape of taU weeds: "Hear of the 
bombing raid last night? 2,300 tons!" to which the other replies, 
"That wasn7t a bombing raid! It was a Protective Reaction Strike!" 
This exchange dlustrates two crucial aspects of human studies in general 
and the study of history in particular: first, that most historical "facts" 
represent problems of interpretation long before they reach history 
books, and second, that problems of language are always involved as well. 
Language inevitably seems to make man into what Roger Fowler 
calls "a fiction-making animal": "We understand our universe by naming 
its parts - or so we like to think. Of course what we really do is 
partition our universe fictionally by an imposed grid of language."2 
This is poignantly obvious in the expressions above, where the "bombing 
raid" and the "Protective Reaction Strike" conjure up, as it were, 
two different worlds, in both of which there are 2,300 tons of hard 
"facts." One may indeed ask which world makes the "facts" most 
"fictional," or whose "fictions" are the most "factual." 
In order to exist by themselves, "facts" would, it appears, have to 
stay outside language - the moment they enter it, they become part 
of a partzcular reality. They enter a specific emotional context as well: 
when the cartoon character above says that "they drop bombs in both 
cases. There's no difference," the other one exclaims, "There's a big 
difference, fellah! A Protective Reaction Strike means not having to 
say you're sorry."3 Thus our emotional reactions and attitudes are 
inextricably intenvoven into the very words we use - into the web of 
our "facts" and "fictions." 
Out of "facts," then, and indeed into "facts," we build our own 
constructions of "reality." However social or cultural (i.e. collectively 
shared) these constructions often may be, they are nevertheless a kind 
of "fictions" - stories which we spin out of the chronicles of the world 
and the biography of our own lives. In his introduction to Mznd and 
Nature: A Necessary Unity, biologist/anthropolog~st Gregory Bateson 
tells the story of a man who asked his computer, "Do you compute 
that you will ever thi& like a human being?" to which the computer 
finally printed out its answer: "THAT REMINDS M E  O F  A 
STORY."* In Greek and Latin the word for hzstory and story was of 
course the same, meaning a narrative, a tale (originally designating 
both real and imaginary ones!) - and the two words are stdl identical 
in for instance modern French (hirtoire), German (Geschichte), and 
Scandinavian (hzrtorie). If we all view the world in terms of stories, 
then the problems of interpretation in historical and cultural studies 
do not become essentially different from those in literary scholarship. 
Of course historical and literary sources are also different somehow. 
The trouble, however, lies with the word somehow: the question becomes 
whether the differences actually make much of a difference for the 
systematic interpretation of historical and literary sources. Kristian Hvidt 
insists that they do: the border line between the disciplines of history 
and literary criticism goes "between fact and fiction," and that line is 
"clear and sharp." Later, however, Hvidt admits as a potentially 
legitimate discipline - 'Complementary" to the history of hard "facts" 
- "the area of feelings, of psychological effects, of environment etc." 
which is "the playground for scholars in literature" and which he had 
previously kept strictly but somewhat regretfully apart from the study 
of history proper. I almost wish he had stuck to his original heavy guns 
when patrolling his border between fact and fiction. To dismiss fictive 
"facts" while paying attention to fictive feelings is somewhat inconsistent: 
if "Ellis Island" in an immigrant novel is not a "fact," then neither, 
surely, is for instance a feeling of "uprootedness" in the novel. According 
to such a literal view, in literature even "facts," however referential they 
may be (like bombs in Vietnam), are "fictional," whereas in historical 
sources even "fictions," however far-fetched they may be (like "Protective 
Reaction Strikes") are "factual" because they historically "existi' 
My phrasing of these distinctions is indicative of my own sense of 
their precariousness. However well they appeal to our penchants for 
departmentalization, they end up becoming untenable. The term 
"fiction" may of course be reserved exclusively for "imaginative 
literature," but then everything else becomes a "fact," which would 
represent too extreme a break with ordinary usage. O n  the other hand, 
if "fiction" is to be used to indicate something that is part of both 
literature and life, then "fact" becomes an awkward counterpart, since 
"fact" and literarj fantasy seem almost a contradiction in terms. What 
we need is therefore a set of terms connoting a framework of inter- 
relations instead of radical differences. The most pervasive common 
denominator between literary and "ordinary" communication is of 
course that of language itself. As has already been pointed out, however, 
language is a figurative means of expression; it inevitably constructs, 
as much as it reflects, our world. Words are signr for things, and mus! 
not be confused with the things themselves. That language is figurative 
means that it is always both referential and non-referential, that it 
has both a "real-life" and a "make-believe" dimension at the same time. 
In order to make us see the interconnections between literature and 
history more clearly - or more precisely, the interrelations between 
literary and "ordinary" language - I tentatively suggest that the terms 
"factual" vs. "fictional" be replaced by the pair referentzal vs. virional, 
as long as it is clearly understood that both terms describe both "ordinary" 
and "literary" uses of language. "Visional" may sound like an awkward 
and strange term, but it is chosen in order to avoid phrases like 
"imaginative" or 'kreative," which connote too much besides "fantasy." 
Vkional is not part of ordinary usage and is here specifically used to 
signify that which is produced by imaginative visions; that which is 
not simply made, but made up; that which is a matter of fantasy and 
make-believe. It is perhaps hard to keep constantly in mind this 
figurative, umhzvalent function of language. The only. instance in which 
we sccm to bc familiar with this referential non-referentiality is in 
connection with conventional poetic metaphors. Thus, when the bride 
of "The Song of Solomon" says that "I am a rose of Sharon,/ a lily 
ol the valleys," we do not mistake her for a flower; and when ihe 
bridcgroom says to her that "Your lips distil nectar, my bride;/honey 
and milk are under your tongue," we are not liable to think that, upon 
kissing her, he discovers that she has just eaten breakfast - despite 
the fact that rose, lily, honey, and milk are all bonafide refercnces. And 
what is true of such metaphors is also true of the language of an ordinary 
conversation or an imaginative work of fiction.5 Language nevcr seems 
to be able to pin down, so to speak, some "reality" that is one- 
dimensional and stili; instead it constantly flickers ambiguously between 
ihat which is made and that which it makes up. 
All this may serve to remind us that an important field of study is 
absent from Kristian Hvidt's Humanities fable, historically a grandchild 
of the arrhctypal Humanities Mother, I suppose, but so intimately 
bound up with the two oldest children, the studies of Literature and 
History, that rumors of incest abound. This progeny, called Iinguistics, 
has during the last couple of decades become a true problem child for 
the whole Humanitics family More than both social sciences and 
Marxism, which Hvidt considers rcsponsible for the breakdown of 
traditional disciplinary boundaries, linguistics has tended to vcnture 
into large areas of the Humaniora world, primarily in terms of its recent 
concern with structuralism and semiotics. The most radical semiotic 
theories in fact do away with history dtogether. Here texts, whether 
literary or historical, are regarded not to refer to a world "out there"; 
instead, the words of any written source are rcgardcd as signs in an 
autononious linguistic system continually commenting upon itself. 
Any historical-minded critic must of course reject this extreme position 
and insist on the mutual interpla~ and interdependence of lanLguage 
and history. But semiotics has nevertheless served to make some 
historians more aware of the extensive role of language in what we may 
describe as our figurative constructions of "reality" It has also served 
to make the historical study of literature lcss mechanically refercntial. 
The "fact-minded" historian and the exclusively "fiction-minded" 
literary critic may, however, retrench and dig themselves in in the last 
ditch by objecting Siat, no matter how figurative historical sources may 
bc, I am nontheless mixing up two kznds of "fictionaliiy": the visional 
dimension of historical sources is of a different character from that of 
literature. Be it far from me to suggcst otherwise. Most of thc experiences 
presented in historical sources, although figurative, are written or read 
as referring to something that has "really," "actually," taken place (ior 
instance "Protcctive Reaciion Strikes"), whereas those of literature 
are usually rcad as make-believe, i.e. as having not happcncd. Yet the 
diffcrcnces involved arc quite relative and highly amorphous. Our 
conventions of reading make us after all often regard the expericnces 
prcscnted in literary works as bcing closely reluted to those of "real 
l~fc"; and life, we say, imitates fiction. What is more, ihe language 
of "fictional" discourse is always referential at the same time, and the 
language of "real-life" discourse also functions in the imaginative manner 
of "poctic" means of expression. Again it is crucial to emphasizc h a t  
the belief in a specific "reality" is a matter of cultural conditioning: 
to people of one culture or sub-cuIture, the belicfs of radically different 
cultural groups oficn seem "fictional." Unconventiondly speaking, 
"real" worlds are simply myths - storics - within which there are, 
conventionally speaking, worlds of make-bclieve (like those of dreams, 
fables, game?, «r imaginative literature). 
My point in h is  essay is not that thc fictions of literary makc-believe 
and cultural beliefs arc functionally identical; all I want to argue is that, 
since hoth historical and literary source matcrials are linguistic, figurative 
ones, they must be intrrpreted in similar ways - i.e. that the nature 
of linguistic expression incvitdbly imposes upon them the same znter- 
pretzve problems. Thus whrthcr events have taken place or not is not 
pertinent for the way in which we semiotically and structurally study 
ihcir meaning, i.e. thrir expression, within the sources thcmselves. 
'l'here can be no csscntial difference involved when it comes to our 
analysis of the "fiction" they construct, the "figuren they make, ihc 
"story" they tell. 
Although my references so far have been mainly to anthropologists, 
linguists, and literary critics, I may point out that Carl Recker, for 
instance, held similar vicws (although much less extensive) alrcady by the 
1930s. As hc saw it in a paper entitled "What Are Historical Facts?" 
from 1926, historical sources always involve re-presented evcnts, hence 
smnething that is incscapably emblematzc rather than merely "real" or 
"factual." Thus the study of history deals only with ~ymbols of events: 
"In truth the actual past is gone; and the world of history is an intangible 
world, re-created imaginatively, and present in our mindsl'6 A passage 
from Becker's seminal Presidential Address to the Amcrican Historical 
Association in 1931 actually combines the concept of history as an 
''. imaginative reconstruction" of the past with the idea of history as 
a linguistic means of expression - hence history, like literature, becomes 
not a reflection of some "objective" "truth," but rather a production 
of the subjective vision of the writer himself 
Left to themselves, the facts do not speak; Ieft to themselves thcy do not cxist, 
not really, sincc for all practical purposes therc is no fact until somc onc affirms 
it ... the form and substance of historical facts, having a negotiable existcncc 
only in literary discourse, vary with the words employed to convey thcm. Sincc 
his.tory is not part of the external material world, but an imaginative reconstruc- 
tion of vanished events, its form and substance are inseparable: in the rcalm of 
literary discourse substance, being an idea, is form; and form, convcying thc idea, 
is substance. It is thus not the undiscriminated fact, but the perceiving mind of' 
the historian that speaks . . .7  
Among the historians debating in this issue of American Studies in 
Scandinauia, Skårdal seems to be the one most consistently concerned 
with the way in which historical writings (primary as well as secondary 
sources) are linguistic "constructions" of the past, whereas Hvidt more 
often uses phrases that seem to connote some conception of the existence 
of absolute substances, like "mirroring the truth," "reconstmct facts," and 
"illustration of reality." As Gene Wise suggests in his book American 
Hirtorical Explanationr; we should perhaps talk "not of 'reality' and of 
'truth' vir-&vir that reality, but of éxperience' and of éxplanatiom' uh-&u& 
that experience.'% Such formulations serve to bring out the interpretiue 
frame of mind which guides the work of the literary scholar as well. 
It is important to be aware of what, precisely, I am arguing here, and 
what I am not arguing. I am not arguing that the studies of history 
and literature should be considered similar in all important senses. 
They are most certainly separate disciplines with different cognitive 
concerns. A good deal of historical scholarship involves types of analysis 
and generalization that are not usually part of literary studies. The 
study of history frequently comprises an enormous amount of sources; 
literary criticism usually only one or a few texts. History often studies 
sources for their presentation of one, or a few, specific issues, and does 
not discuss the rest of the thematic implications within the individual 
source; literary analysis usually focuses on the totality, the over-all 
interplay, of numerous elements within the single text. History is 
concerned with sifting out inconsistencies and implausibilities caused 
by bias and subjectivity (not least by constantly checking sources against 
other sources); the study of literature involves by necessity the subjective 
textual features themselves. The generalizations of history are often 
supra-textual, i.e. constructions of collective 'issues (economic, social, 
cultural) that may not be fully present and developed in any one text; 
the generalizations of literary studies are by necessity zntra-textiial, i.e. 
constructions of the intrinsic characteristics of one specific text. In short, 
historical studies and literary studies are different from each othcr in the 
sense that the concern in the former is often a collective or representative 
one, whereas in the latter it tends to be an individual or particular 
one. 
What I o m  arguing, however, is that the dichotomy of '~kct"vs. y c t i o n N  
is inept, unproductive, and even downright misleading when used to 
characterize historical vs. literary sources, and consequently historical 
vs. literary studies. Such a distinction reduces the interpretative poten- 
tiality of both disciplines, since both kinds of sources and studies are 
both referential and "fictional." Involved here is more than a mere 
squabble over terms: the disagreement marks two distinct attitudes 
to life, and to human studies as well. The "fact vs. fictioncattitude 
implies that life can be analyzed literalb, so to speak: that "facts" can 
be separated from values, description (information) from interpretation, 
thought from ideology, "reality" from myth, and life from literature. 
In short, it reflects a belief in the existence of some sort of "objective" 
knowledge. My position, on the other hand, is that life must be analyzed 
figuratively: that "facts" do not exist apart from our valuations, that 
description ir interpretation, that thought k ideology, that "reality" ir 
a myth, and that life B, in an empirical sense, a story. It is essential 
for scholars within the human studies to realize that substance and 
fantasy are intimately bound up with each other - that social life is 
always a mixture of the referential and the imaginary, and that indeed 
cultural myths, however well foundyd or unfounded, help form our 
behavior, and vice versa. Understandzng - whether scientific or not 
- is part of this proces: our world is not there, apart from us, waiting 
to be understood; we construct it in the very act of trying to understand 
it. Historical or literary knowledge is therefore not something that we 
merely find "in" texts and which lie there independently from us; it is 
something which we actively muh in the act of reading them.Vhus it 
is also impossible to distinguish radically between the ways in which 
we interpret our beliefs, and the ways in which we interpret our make- 
belieue, like literature: they are part and parcel of each other. 
That all experience is subjective, however, does not mean that it is 
all random, or that it cannot be studied systernatically. It simply means 
that we have to substitute the opposition (bobjective" vs. subjective with 
oppositions like collective vs. individml, and representative vs. particulal: 
Obviously, some types of experiences, ideas, and values are representative 
of, and even collectively shared by, people of a society or a specific 
social group, and these may be analytically distinguished from those 
of a more individual or particular nature. This does not mean, however, 
that what Hvidt calls "the vexed question of representativity" can 
serve as a criterion for dividing historical from literary sources. The 
single source, interpreted in isolation - be it literary or historical - 
is simply expressive of a single, particular point of view. "Represen- 
tativeness" is not some quality inbent in historical or other sources. 
The hypothesis we frame, the problem we investigate, the questions 
we ask, are what in each case determines the representative status of 
a source. We make sources representative, or particularly parts of them, 
on the basis of our interpretation of our selection of source materials. 
Representativeness remains an abstract construct, an invention of the 
analyst - a "fiction," if you will. 
Like other human activities, literature is an historical phenomenon; 
consequently literary texts must be regarded as potentially representative, 
in historical terms, as any other kinds of sources. Its historical represen- 
tativeness may fall into two interrelated classes, one more directly 
"cultural," and one more directly "formal." Literature may in the 
first place involve both an imaginative reflection of, and response to, 
the culture in which it is written, i.e. the representatzue or collectzue ideas, 
values, and feelings prevalent at a specific time. What is more, general 
characteristics of literary form and conventions may be representative 
of particular historical conditions as well: what we call "Romantic" 
literature or "Victorian" fiction or "modernist" poetry signify specific 
hzstorical changes. Both the "cultural" and the "formal" types of literary 
representativeness are a major concern for the student of literature 
using an historical approach to the analysis of literary works, and may 
of course be the object of systematic scientific study. Literary studies 
(in contradistinction to historical ones) are too often mistakenly regarded 
as impressionistic and hence non-empirical. It is important to point out 
that Skårdal's characterization of the historian is equally applicable to 
the student of literature: a scholar "who uses words like an author, 
but who is bound to source materials by methods that approach those 
of science in the evaluation of evidence and the construction and testing 
of hypotheses in order to reach logical conclusions." In the case of the 
literary critic, however, it is the imaginative works of literature which 
represent the sources submitted to a painstakingly close, systematic 
analysis. Thus both historical and literary studies may be as rigidly 
empirical as they are consistently non-positivistic. 
As far as the study of complex historical problems is concerned, 
however, it is obvious that they involve numerous questions of gene- 
ralization and representativenss that no single type of sources can provide 
a satisfactory answer to. A great number of various kinds of sources 
are required to analyze the interplay of different historical forces, to 
evaluate their respective importance, and to interpret their significance. 
As a more general observation, however, we may say that to use only 
literature as a source, or nothing but newspaper reports, or exclusively 
diaries and letters, carries its own risk of distortion and one-sidedness. 
The crux of the matter may be that we can never be quite sure that the 
cornmon denominators within one kind of sources do not spring from 
their intrinsic character as a specific type of source material, rather 
than from that which is shared by a whole culture. Thus we always have 
to make cross-checks with other kinds of sources as well. In retrospect, 
of course, some of these sources, including literary ones, may be found 
to be perfect embodirnents of collective and representative issues. 
Of course the historian may or may not make use of literary source 
material, as the student of literature may or may not make use of 
"ordinary" historical sources in order to help him interpret literary 
works. The rest of this essay, however, is specifically concerned with 
the interaction between historical and literary studies, and is directed 
at those historians and literary critics who are dealing with (or want 
to deal with) the problems of such interdisciplinary work. The central 
question here, then, is no longer whether imaginative literature may 
embody representative experiences and ideas, but in what way it does 
so. The widespread scepticism among historians toward using literature 
as a source springs, I believe, primarily from an analytical and 
methodological insecurity vis-a-vis this question of how we interpret 
material that is avowedly a matter of make-believe, and thus, as a whole, 
wilfully figurative. 
The starting point for any type of literary study is not to read literature 
literally as if, sax the characters or the setting of a novel were merely 
representative of people or places. No literary element has a definite, 
historical meaning only "in itself." It receives its complete significance 
in terms of its figurative status - that is, as a combination of referentiality 
and fictionality. Per Hansa in Rdvaag's novel both is, and is not, 
a Norwegian-American immigrant; his Dakota both is, and is not, a 
territory by that name in America. What Per, or Dakota, "is not" simply 
- .  
indicates what they are a.s well, namely deliberate constructions, poetic 
elements played out against each other in the imaginative vision of the 
work of art, where they all (characters, events, plots, etc.) mutually 
develop and qualify each other. The lesson of this is two-fold: first, that 
the significance of a literary work is emblematic and requires an 
imaginative tranrlation rather than a paraphrase, and second, that one 
literary element (like "character") acquires its ful1 meaning in terms of 
its relations to the other means of expression in the work of literature. 
In literature, the social environment is "setting," people are "characters," 
and objects serve as "images" or even "symbols": these are terms literary 
students employ to indicate h a t  they must be studied as a combination 
of signs which are also expressive of literary conuentionr. 
This does not mean that these literary inventions/conventions are 
without historical significance. It merely means that we cannot proceed 
directly with referential interpretations when confronted with a literary 
work - that we must interpret these literary figures of speech before 
we proceed to translate the wor k into historical terms. Consequently any 
scholar who wants to use literature as an historical source must be 
familiar with literary theory and methods, with literary history and 
conventions, and with the close reading of specific texts. Without this 
basic training, the interpreter of a literary work will too easily fail 
to deal with the cultural translation of its literary form, which is 
synonymous with the historical significance of its vision of the world. 
But, if the historical study of literature consists of a tranrlation of literary 
means of expression into historical terms, then these historical terms must 
be given equal attention. One cannot make a good translation from one 
language to another without being thoroughly familiar with both. Thus 
I disagree with Hvidt's statement that literary students "tend to read 
too much history in their mistaken attempt to see whether fictive 
literature reproduces a true picture of the scene." On the contrary, 
most studies of literature - even those which purport to be historical 
- bear witness to superficial and slipshod historical work. They abound 
with hackneyed cultural observations which lack particularity and 
substantiation: a work is simply said to express "the spirit of the period," 
its "rarnpant materialism" or perhaps its "deep social concern," "the 
values of the small town" or "the urban way of life" - or whatever. If 
significant interdisciplinary work is to be done, however, assertions 
about the relationship between a literary work and history must be 
empirically sound. Therefore the literary student must be familiar with 
historiography and historical methods, with problems of social and 
cultural representativeness, and with the interpretation of historical 
source material. Familiarity with both major and minor events and issues 
of a given period will make him catch historical references and associa- 
tions in a literary work that would othenvise pass him by; and a firm 
grasp of the central ideological conflicts of that time is the prerequisite 
for recognizing their imaginative transformation into literary form. 
Thus both a literary and an historical competence are required in 
order to perceive how a literary "language" (of character and setting 
as well as symbols and style) can be translated into a cultural statement. 
In my opinion, Skårdal downplays the difficulties involved in this type 
of interpretation when she speaks of how authors use their understanding 
of their time "for artistic and didactic ends that the historian must 
take into account": "These are seldom difficult to identify by one trained 
in literary criticism." On the contrary, I fmd it an extremely complicated 
matter to analyze this interplay between literature and society, between 
the individual and the cultural, between the subjective and the collective. 
As Skårdal points out, the general consciousness of an author's time 
"molds his interpretations, his attitudes, and his use of language.'' 
What complicates this process irnrnensely, however, is that the author's 
individual style and subjective vision also mold his figurative expression 
of "the general consciousness" of his time. To put it more simply, a 
literary work does not only represent a rejlection oJ; but also a reaction to, 
a specific period, and thzi reaction zi imbedded in  the uey  texture of the literury 
work ihe8  It is only in the last few decades that historical-sociological 
- 
studies of literature have begun to pay attention to this formative nature 
of literary works, through which they are seen not merely to reproduce, 
but also to produce, historical meaning. This cutting both ways is an 
equivocal and complicated matter, the study of which must std be 
said to be in its infancy: many steps within this translation of literary 
texture into cultural ideas must be said to represent "black boxes" 
waiting to be fded with demonstrable analytical procedures. 
When faced with the complexity of these interpretive problems, 
the historian may feel justified in his scepticism towards literary sources 
and may scuttk happily back to his purely historical material. Yet 
everything I have tried to argue in this essay is intended to embitter 
his reaction of happy belief. I have tried to suggest that al1 written or 
. 
oral sources are imaginative constructions, referential and imaginary 
at the same time, and inevitably expressive of a subjective point of view. 
Thus not even sources whose languages are traditionally considered 
relatively "hard" are exempt from this - for instance that of official 
documents rather than personal diaries. The historian pursues an 
illusion if he regards the meaning of such sources as directly "para- 
phrasable," i.e. if he thinks that they simply "contain" historical "infor- 
mation" that can be directly "transferred" as "facts" to his own study. 
Of course the use and perception of figurativeness vary from source to 
source and reader to reader: it may be quite deliberately practiced and 
read as such, like for imtance in poetry ("Your lips distil nectar"); it may be 
part-consciously employed and understood, as in various types ofpolitical 
"languages" ("bombing raids" or "Protective Reaction Strikes"); or 
it may be by and large unconsciously presented and perceived, as often 
in everyday speech or in what we regularly regard as "referential 
language" (e.g., "the vexed question of representativity"). No source 
presents pure "information"; imbedded in the very language of'which 
it is made, is always a particular figurative and didactic response. The 
historian is at every turn confronted with things both being, and being 
not, referential. This inescapable ambismity may not make him happy 
but - c'est la vie. 
In order to underscore the interpretive interconnections between 
historical and literary studies, let me close with a small anecdote - 
a story - from "real life," or rather from my dream life, slightly 
heightened, perhaps, through poetic licence. Some weeks ago I had this 
nightmare about taking an English oral exam on the podium of some 
enormous auditorium with two examiners seated before me. One of 
them seemed to be a professor of linguistics who kept hissing into his 
microphone with an unmistakably Norwegian accent: "He's made 
THREE concord mistakes in one hour and ten minutes! He's made 
THREE concord mistakes in one hour and ten minutes!" The other 
examiner was a woman professor of literature in a black dress and 
shawl who seemed singularly unimpressed with my discussion. She 
was not listening any more; I knew I had not made it but continued 
talking. Suddenly, however, she looked up from her black knitting: 
"All right, then - what do you mean when you keep saying that 
literature is imaginatiue?" Everything grew quiet; even the linguistics 
professor stopped hissing. Imaginative literature ... IMAGINATIVE ... 
Finally I stuttered to break the silence: "It is sort of ... well, like my 
wife. When I say h a t  I love her, she says that it isn't really her I love." 
All at once the examiners and the whole auditorium burst into laughter. 
And then, like a silly puppet, I started laughing as well, although it felt 
more like crying. 
Such laughter may have grown steadily more shrill in the last few 
decades as linguists, anthropologists, and psychologists have started 
to deprive us of the stability of our "facts." Our  laughter is also in many 
ways a particularly Western one, engendered by a deep-rooted positivistic 
tradition from which we have great difficulties of freeing ourselves. 
Ironically the theories of the so-called hard sciences have long since 
shorn their positivistic chains. But as long as we, historians and literary 
students alike, departmentalize wives or literature (or dreams or 
husbands or bombs or Per Hansas or Ronald Reagans) into a world 
of' either "faet" or ['fiction," the studies of the humanities remain at 
a standstill. 
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